

**DRAFT**  
**NSC BRIEFING**

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11 August 1954

(used)

**FRENCH NORTH AFRICA**

- I. Long-standing North African ferment has increased in French Morocco in past fortnight; has almost completely died down in Tunisia.**
- A. French government made surprise concession gesture to Tunisian nationalists 31 July.**
- B. Premier Mendes-France proffered three-fold program in lightning trip to Tunis. Terms: internal autonomy for Tunisia; military and diplomatic union--revision of protectorate treaties; guarantee of French interests.**
- C. Formation new Tunisian cabinet delayed week by French refusal to agree its composition--10 Tunisians, 4 French. As finally approved, cabinet contains 4 prominent moderate Tunisian nationalists, 2 of whom will participate in negotiations with France.**
- D. However, French settlers continue strongly oppose "concessions."**

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**II. Current situation in Morocco marked by upsurge violence.**

**A. "Month of vengeance," to commemorate French dethronement Sultan last August, has already resulted in death toll of over 70 and 250 injured.**

**B. Riots concentrated three areas:**

**1. Fez--religious center.**

**2. Petitjean--industrial area, near US Air Force base, Sidi Slimane.**

**3. Port Lyantey--site of US naval air base.**

**C. Potential danger peak during August:**

**1. Incidents and riots of past week attended religious holidays--on eve of which, last year, Sultan Ben Youssef was deposed. Disorders likely to continue until 20 August, calender anniversary of dethronement.**

**D. Mendes-France stated in National Assembly (10 August) that main objective in Morocco for present is restore order, seek settlement with present Sultan.**

**1. This sharp contrast with Tunisian policy, which highlights negotiations with nationalist leaders, grant of internal autonomy.**

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### **III. Short-term Prospects:**

**A. In absence more substantial French policy change, agitation and sporadic disorders likely to continue.**

**B. Formerly pro-French Moroccans will become increasingly disillusioned.**

**1. One group being increasingly alienated by French**

**"do-nothing" policy, particularly in contrast Tunisia.**

**2. Second group, exemplified by Berber chieftain El Glaoui,**

**equally disillusioned by French failure take stronger repressive stand.**

**3. Settlers, worried by possibility of French concessions,**

**will increase pressure on Assembly.**

### **IV. Long-term Problems:**

**A. French replacement of unacceptable Sultan (apparently not now envisioned by Mendes-France) would not necessarily ameliorate situation.**

**1. While it would be a prerequisite to further discussions**

**with nationalists, would not be acceptable to settler groups.**

**B. Institution of limited reforms in Moroccan administration,**

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a likely French proposal, would be incomplete solution.

1. It would always be object of increased nationalist demands.

2. And always subject to French settler pressures.

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